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practical impediments to realizing just preservation.
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Just preservation raises the bar for the moral consideration of non-human animals in
conservation, advancing long overdue calls for consilience in science (Wilson 1998). Treves et al.
(2019) argue that we need to “level the playing field for human and non-human animals” for the
sake of just preservation.
In 2012, leading scientists from around the world agreed that:
“Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical,
neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the
capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates
that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate
consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other
creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.” (Low 2012)
The need to recognize non-human animal sentience is as pressing in conservation science as in
other fields. Philosophical debates about individual animal welfare have either been ignored on
the grounds of human exceptionalism (Dawkins 1990; Chapman & Huffman 2018) or rejected as
“emotional” reasoning. In conservation science, some endorse a form of “moral blindness”
(Bauman & Donskis 2013) about the needs of their own research subjects. Treves et al. are taking
an important step toward remedying this.
Reconciling Species Needs. Treves et al. pose thoughtful questions about whether “advocatetrustees” could adequately represent or define the interests of non-human animals. Disciplines
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that have explored similar questions for decades (e.g., ecophilosophy, feminist geography, animal
geography) may provide some insight. Multi-species ethnographic studies recognize that
sentience is not a unique capacity to humans (Smart 2014, Lynn 1998). A human analogue can
sometimes suffice to define the needs of non-human animals (Horowitz 2016). Non-human
animals can understand relationships, space, and patterns well enough to ascribe meaning to
landscapes (Creswell 1996, Paquet & Alexander 2019). As individual animals are dying en masse
and many species are on the brink of extinction, there is an urgent need to broaden our
perspective on the needs of sentient life on our planet (Haraway 1991, Nightingale 2003).
Reconciling Voices – Achievable and Practical? Treves et al. write: “anything less than … balancing
the well-being of humans and nonhumans, now and into the future, would be anthropocentric
and unjust.” Worldviews are reasonably well considered in the climate change debate (Joyce et
al. 2010, Koltko-Rivera 2004), but anthropocentric worldviews as they relate to wildlife are not
well studied; anthropocentrism covers a spectrum of ethics and behaviours, from killing animals
in order to maintain ecosystem balance, to killing animals in order to end the suffering of sick or
injured animals, to loving wild animals to death (by feeding them) (Alexander & Draper 2019).
The empirical evidence on sentience suggests that leveling the playing field amongst humans and
non-humans is the morally correct approach; but this calls for greater inclusivity and
representation (of disciplines, demographics, species, etc.). Treves et al. write that the “adult”
world created an unjust preservation paradigm. Laying the blame on “adults” seems to gloss over
a huge gender and ethnic inequity chasm in conservation science. In the past, voices of women
and girls — indigenous and ethnically diverse — were ignored. Their inclusion might have made a
difference much earlier on and could certainly enrich the conversation today. It has taken (mostly)
male voices such as Treves et al.’s to legitimize animal welfare and rights in conservation science.
Yet the same considerations have been raised by other genders and ethnic groups for decades
(Haraway 1991). We should diversify authorship in all of our publications. If we preservation
scientists cannot address this lack of inclusivity and representation, how can we convince an
entire planet to accept just preservation for non-human animals?
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